When is the value of public information positive in a game?  by Kitti, Mitri & Mallozzi, Lina
J. Math. Anal. Appl. 374 (2011) 49–56Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and
Applications
www.elsevier.com/locate/jmaa
When is the value of public information positive in a game?
Mitri Kitti a,∗, Lina Mallozzi b,1
a Department of Economics, Aalto University School of Economics, Arkadiankatu 7, 00100 Helsinki, Finland
b Department of Mathematics and Applications, University of Naples Federico II, V. Claudio, 21, 80125 Naples, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 18 May 2009
Available online 9 September 2010
Submitted by J.A. Filar
Keywords:
Bayesian games
Incomplete information
Value of information
Public information
Multiple equilibria
The value of public information is studied by considering the equilibrium selections that
maximize the weighted sum of players’ payoffs. We show that the value of information
can be deduced from the deterministic games where the uncertain parameters have given
values. If the maximal weighted sum of equilibrium payoffs in deterministic games is
convex then the value of information in any Bayesian game derived from the deterministic
games is positive with respect to the selection. We also show the converse result
that positive value of information implies convexity. Hence, the convexity of maximal
weighted sum of payoffs in deterministic games fully characterizes the value of information
with respect to considered selections. We also discuss the implications of our results
when positive value of information means that for any equilibrium in a game with less
information there is a Pareto dominant equilibrium in any game with more information.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A fundamental question for decision making under incomplete information is the value of information. The works of
Blackwell [3,4] show that more information is beneﬁcial in single-agent decision problems. In economic situations involving
multiple decision makers the situation is different; more information may have adverse effects as some of the parties
gain from more information while others lose. Hirchleifer [7] was the ﬁrst to notice this phenomenon in the framework
of exchange economies. Ponssard [13], Vives [16], and Sakai [15] observed that more information can be undesirable in
oligopolistic settings as well.
In this paper we study the value of public information in two-player games where the uncertainty is exogenous and
all the players have exactly the same information, i.e. the information is public. For example, publicly available forecasts,
reports, and indicators on the conditions of ﬁrms’ economically relevant environment provide such information. The positive
value of information refers to the comparative statics property that more information increases players’ payoffs. A major
challenge for examining the value of information is the coordination problem arising from the multiplicity of equilibria. To
overcome the coordination problem we consider the value of information with respect to selections. We say that the value
of information is λ-positive if the maximal weighted sum of equilibrium payoffs with weights λ and (1−λ) increases when
more information becomes available.
We show that the value of information can be deduced from the properties of equilibrium payoffs in deterministic games
where the uncertain parameters are known. The ﬁrst result of this kind was shown by Einy et al. [5] for symmetric Cournot
duopolies with unique equilibrium. In these games the value of information is positive when the deterministic equilib-
rium payoff function is convex. We extend this result to asymmetric games with multiple equilibria. Moreover, we show
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sum of equilibrium payoffs in the deterministic games. Hence, convexity fully characterizes the λ-positive value of public
information.
As in [5], we assume that the utility functions are aﬃne in uncertain parameters. We also take the information partition
approach to incomplete information, which means that players know a set that contains the uncertain state of the world.
The state of the world determines the values of payoff relevant parameters. This dependence is not, however, assumed
to take any particular form. Moreover, the states of the world can be discrete as well as continuous. In addition to [5],
Bassan et al. [1] and Lehrer and Rosenberg [10] have recently considered the value of information in games by using the
information partition approach. Lehrer and Rosenberg consider the restrictions that Bayesian games impose on the value of
information. They avoid the problems arising from multiple equilibria by restricting to zero-sum games. Bassan et al. deﬁne
the positive value of information property for a game by requiring that any pair of equilibrium payoffs in a game with
less information is dominated by equilibrium payoffs in a game with more information. In essence, we shall observe that
λ-positive value of information for all λ ∈ [0,1] is a necessary condition for this property.
Common interest games are an important class of games that have the positive value of information property and
possibly multiple equilibria. Moreover, as shown by Bassan et al., if we ﬁx a set of payoffs and require that all games
with this payoff set have positive value of information property, then these games have the common interest property.
Considering various solution concepts, Ref. [11] provides a characterization for one information structure being better than
another in common interest games. We shall discuss common interest games in view of our assumptions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Bayesian game with public information and discusses the
existence of Bayesian–Nash equilibrium. In Section 3 we show that the value of information is positive with respect to
a selection when the function of the maximal weighted sum of equilibrium payoffs in underlying normal from games is
convex. The relationship of the positive value of information property and λ-selections is discussed in Section 4.
2. The model
2.1. Bayesian game
Let Ω be the set of states of nature, let F be a σ -ﬁeld on Ω , and let μ be a probability measure on (Ω,F). We assume
that there are two utility maximizing players that we index with i ∈ I = {1,2}. The restriction for two-player games is for
the sake of simplicity and all the results of this paper readily extend to games with more players.
Before the players act they are informed on a subset of Ω that contains the realized state of nature. To be speciﬁc,
players’ information is described by a σ -subﬁeld H of F and a probability measure μ on (Ω,F). If the realized state of
nature is ω, then the players know for any C ∈ H whether ω belongs to C or not, i.e. they are informed that ω belongs to
Cω =⋂{C ∈ H: ω ∈ C}. The information is public as both players have the same knowledge on the realized state of nature.
The sets of available actions are denoted as X1 and X2 for players 1 and 2, respectively. These sets are assumed to
be subsets of Euclidean spaces. The set of action proﬁles is denoted as X = X1 × X2. The players choose their actions
simultaneously and their utilities depend on the action proﬁle x = (x1, x2) and a random parameter vector a(ω) ∈ A, where
the parameter space A is a convex subset of Rm . The utility functions are of the form ui(x,a(ω)), i ∈ I . We also denote
u = (u1,u2). The mapping a is assumed to belong to A which is a space of integrable functions from Ω into A. To be
speciﬁc, a is a measurable function on A and its σ -ﬁeld, and all the component functions of a are integrable.
The Bayesian game deﬁned for given utility functions u, function a, and σ -subﬁeld H of F is denoted as Γ (u|a,H).
When studying the value of information we let a and H vary; Γ (u) denotes the family of Bayesian games obtained in this
way. A strategy for player i is to choose his action conditional on the information he has. As the information depends on
the state of nature, the player’s strategy is an H-measurable function from Ω to Xi . By si(ω) ∈ Xi we denote the action that
player i chooses for given ω. Moreover, s(ω) denotes the strategy proﬁle (s1(ω), s2(ω)). When s1 and s2 are H-measurable
we say that s = (s1, s2) is an H-measurable strategy proﬁle. In the following, Mi(H) denotes the set of H-measurable
strategies for player i, and M(H) denotes the set of H-measurable strategy proﬁles. Note that s(ω1) = s(ω2) for s ∈ M(H)
whenever Cω1 = Cω2 .
We assume that the integrals of ui(s(ω),a(ω)), i ∈ I , are well deﬁned for s ∈ M(F), and H. In the following section
we make assumptions on u that guarantee this. By EH[ui(s(ω),a(ω))](ω) we denote the expected utility for player i ∈ I
conditional on the information ﬁeld H and the state of nature ω. When μ(Cω) > 0 we have
EH
[
ui
(
s(ω),a(ω)
)]
(ω) = 1
μ(Cω)
∫
Cω
ui
(
s(ω),a(ω)
)
dμ.
More generally, including the cases when μ(Cω) = 0, the conditional expectation is deﬁned by Radon–Nikodym theorem
[2, Chapter 10].
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle s∗ ∈ M(H) is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of Γ (u|a,H) if
EH
[
ui
(
s∗(ω),a(ω)
)]
(ω) EH
[
ui
(
si(ω), s
∗
−i(ω),a(ω)
)]
(ω) (1)
for all si ∈ Mi(H), i ∈I , and for almost all ω ∈ Ω .
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pected utility with respect to H-measurable strategies while other players’ strategies are kept ﬁxed. We let E[ui(s(ω),a(ω))]
denote player i’s ex-ante expected utility. In the rest of this paper we shall drop the argument ω when it is evident that we
refer to ex-ante expected values. We also denote E[u] = (E[u1], E[u2]). The equivalence of Deﬁnition 1 and ex-ante utility
maximization is stated in the following remark, see, e.g., [5, Remark 2.1].
Remark 1. A strategy proﬁle s∗ ∈ M(H) is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium if and only if E[ui(s∗,a)]  E[ui(si, s∗−i,a)] for all
si ∈ Mi(H) and i ∈ I .
In the ex-ante utility maximization the difference between having different information, i.e. different σ -ﬁeld, is on
players’ having different measurable set of available strategies. In the rest of this paper Bayesian–Nash equilibrium refers to
strategies that maximize players’ ex-ante utilities as in Remark 1.
2.2. Equilibria of Bayesian games
In this section we show that there is a Bayesian equilibrium when all the normal form games {I, X,u(·, a¯)} for ﬁxed
a¯ ∈ A have Nash equilibria. For the purposes of the following sections the main result is that the Bayesian–Nash equilibria
can be constructed from the equilibria of the normal form games, i.e. deterministic games.
We assume that ui , i ∈ I , are aﬃne in a¯. This is our assumption (A1) as stated below.
(A1) ui(x, ·), i ∈ I , are aﬃne for any x ∈ X , i.e. they are of the form ui(x, a¯) = a¯ · gi(x) + hi(x) for some gi : X → Rm and
hi : X →R.
In the above expression of utility function the dot · denotes the usual inner product. Speciﬁc cases when (A1) holds arise
from models with multiplicative and additive uncertainty. For example, in a duopoly setting both demand and cost could
depend on an uncertain multiplier, an uncertain shift, or both. Assumption (A1) does not pose any restrictions on the
functional form of a ∈ A in ω. Hence, the utility functions of the form ui(x, z) = r(z) · gi(x) + hi(x), where z : Ω → B and
r : B →Rm , also ﬁt to our framework by setting a¯ = r(z) and A = r(B).
An important consequence of (A1) is that we can replace a with aH = EH[a] when the information ﬁeld in the game
is H. This is stated in Lemma 1. Note that when A is convex, then the expected value of a random vector a stays within A
for any probability measure μ. Hence, we have aH(ω) ∈ A for all ω, i.e. aH ∈ A.
Lemma 1. Let ui satisfy (A1).
(a) E[ui(s,a)] = E[ui(s,aH)] for any σ -subﬁeld H and s ∈ M(H).
(b) ui(x,aH(·)) is H-measurable for all x ∈ X, a ∈ A, i ∈ I , and for any σ -subﬁeld H.
Proof. Because ui is aﬃne and s is H-measurable, we have
EH[ui] = EH
[
gi(s) · a + hi(s)
]= gi(s) · EH[a] + hi(s).
Result (a) follows by taking expectation. Result (b) is obvious. 
To obtain the existence of Bayesian–Nash equilibrium we shall need the two following assumptions in addition to (A1).
(A2) ui(·, a¯) is continuous for all a¯ ∈ A, i ∈ I ,
(A3) Xi are compact and convex sets, and ui(·, x−i, a¯), i ∈ I , are quasiconcave for all a¯ ∈ A and x−i ∈ X−i .
Note that, assumption (A2) and result (b) in Lemma 1 guarantee that the expected values of utility functions are well
deﬁned.
Before going to the main result of this section we introduce some notation: N(a¯) is the set of Nash equilibria of a
normal form game {I, X,u(·, a¯)} and N(a,H) is the set of Bayesian–Nash equilibria of Γ (u|a,H). Moreover, by BRi(s−i |a,H)
we denote the player i’s best responses to s−i and BRi(x−i, a¯) denotes the best responses to x−i in the normal form game
with parameter a¯.
The following existence result is based on the result that the Nash equilibria of the ex-ante game can be deﬁned from
the Nash equilibria of deterministic normal form games. Recall that non-emptiness of N(a¯) follows from (A2) and (A3), see
e.g. [6, Theorem 1.3.3]. Actually, assumption (A3) could be replaced with the assumption that N(a¯) is a compact non-empty
set for all a¯ ∈ A.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (A1)–(A3), we have N(a,H) = ∅ for all H and a ∈ A, and
N(a,H) = {s∗ ∈ M(H): s∗(ω) ∈ N(aH(ω)) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω}. (2)
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from Ω into A. For the proof we need the functions ui(xi, s−i(ω),aH(ω)), i ∈ I , to be normal integrands in the sense that
for i ∈ I the correspondence Si(ω) = {(xi,α) ∈ Xi ×R: ui(xi, s−i(ω),aH(ω)) α} is closed-valued and H-measurable for all
s−i ∈ M−i(H) and a ∈ A. By Example 14.29 and Proposition 14.45 in [14], this is guaranteed under assumptions (A1), (A2),
and the result (b) of Lemma 1.
Assumptions (A2) and (A3) imply that BRi(x−i, a¯) is non-empty for all x−i ∈ X−i and a¯ ∈ A. Moreover, BRi(s−i(ω),aH(ω))
is closed-valued and measurable, see e.g. [14, Theorem 14.37]. We can also observe that for any si ∈ Mi(H) we have
ui
(
si(ω), s−i(ω),aH
)
 ui
(
xωi , s−i(ω),aH(ω)
)
for a.e. ω ∈ Ω, (3)
where xωi ∈ BRi(s−i(ω),aH(ω)) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω . By measurable selection theorem (see e.g. [14, Corollary 14.6]) there is
si ∈ Mi(H) such that si(ω) ∈ BRi(s−i(ω),aH(ω)) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω . For this strategy we obtain equality in (3) and this strategy
is a maximizer of E[ui(si, s−i,aH)] over Mi(H). Thus, we have
si ∈ BRi(s−i |a,H) ⇐⇒ si(ω) ∈ BRi
(
s−i(ω),aH(ω)
)
,
for i ∈ I and for a.e. ω ∈ Ω and consequently we get (2).
To obtain N(a,H) = ∅ we need to show that there is an H-measurable strategy proﬁle s∗ such that s∗(ω) ∈ N(aH(ω)) for
almost all ω. This follows from the measurable selection theorem, since N(aH(ω)) is non-empty because of (A2) and (A3),
closed-valued and measurable. The latter two properties inherit from BRi(s−i(ω),aH(ω)), i ∈ I . 
Proposition 1 is different from previous existence results [8,12] for Bayesian–Nash equilibrium due to the structure of
equilibria that is obtained under assumption (A1). See [8, Theorem 4.1] for an existence result with inﬁnitely many players
but ﬁnite Ω . Except for assumption (A1), the rest of our requirements for the utility functions are the same as those made
in [8] and [12].
3. Conditions for the λ-positive value of information
By more information we mean that players’ information ﬁeld becomes larger. This is the usual deﬁnition of more infor-
mation and it is also used, e.g. in [1,11]. For an alternative deﬁnition, see [5].
Deﬁnition 2. Let G and H be two σ -subﬁelds of F . We say that G is more informative than H if H ⊆ G .
To overcome the coordination problem arising from the possible multiplicity of equilibria we deﬁne the value of infor-
mation with respect to equilibrium selections that maximize the weighted sum of players’ utilities. We say that the value
of information is λ-positive, λ ∈ [0,1], when the maximum of the weighted sum of expected utilities with weights λ and
(1 − λ) for player 1 and 2, respectively, is higher with more information than with less information. In the following we
denote
V λ(a,H) = max
s∈N(a,H)
{
λE
[
u1(s,a)
]+ (1− λ)E[u2(s,a)]}.
This function will serve as an indication of the value of information with respect to λ-selection. To be precise, the deﬁnition
for positive value of information is the following.
Deﬁnition 3. The value of information is λ-positive in the game Γ (u|a,H) if for any σ -ﬁeld G that is more informative
than H we have
V λ(a,H) V λ(a,G).
The negative value of information is deﬁned by having the inequality in the opposite way in the above deﬁnition. When
a game has both negative and positive value of information with respect to a selection, then the weighted sum of expected
utilities is unaffected by the increase or decrease of information. We can say that the value of information is zero with
respect to the selection in such case. If the value of information is λ-positive and not λ-negative we say that it is strictly
λ-positive.
3.1. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions
The aim of this paper is to answer when the value of public information is positive for Bayesian games Γ (u) obtained
from the parameterized normal form games {I, X,u(·, a¯)}, a¯ ∈ A. In the following γ (u) denotes the family of normal form
games that is obtained by varying a¯. Our main result will not depend on any particular choice of a and H. What matter are
the equilibrium payoffs in γ (u). We show that the value of information with respect to a λ-selection is characterized by
the maximal weighted sum of equilibrium payoffs in games γ (u). For a given a¯ this weighted sum is denoted as
vλ(a¯) = max [λu1(x, a¯) + (1− λ)u2(x, a¯)],
x∈N(a¯)
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is compact and N(a¯) is non-empty and has a closed graph, see e.g. [6, Theorem 1.3.3]. Compactness of N(a¯) and continuity
of ui , i ∈ I , guarantee that there is a maximum in the deﬁnition of vλ which therefore becomes well deﬁned.
The main result for the value of information is the following.
Theorem 1. When ui , i ∈ I , satisfy (A1)–(A3), the value of information is λ-positive, λ ∈ [0,1], in any game Γ (u|a,H) ∈ Γ (u), if vλ
is convex.
Proof. The proof goes through in a similar way as the proof of Proposition 3.3 in [5]. In the proof we need the fact that
we can replace a with its conditional expectation as is the case by Lemma 1. We shall also use the result that V λ(a,H) is
obtained by taking the expectation of vλ . To be more speciﬁc, for any σ -subﬁeld H we have
V λ(a,H) = E[vλ(aH)]. (4)
Note that assumptions (A1)–(A3) guarantee that Γ (u|a,H) has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium for any choice of a ∈ A and H,
see Proposition 1. Moreover, vλ is well deﬁned.
The equality (4) can be shown as follows. First, by (2) we have
V λ(a,H) E[vλ(aH)].
To prove the equality we construct a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium for which the equality is obtained. Let Nλ(a¯) denote
the maximizers of λu1(x, a¯) + (1 − λ)u2(x, a¯). From the continuity of ui , i ∈ I , and compactness of N(a¯) it follows
that Nλ(aH(ω)) ⊆ N(aH(ω)) is a non-empty and compact-valued correspondence. The Nash equilibrium correspondence
N(aH(·)) is H-measurable as noticed in the proof of Proposition 1, and then also Nλ(aH(·)) is H-measurable. By the mea-
surable selection theorem Nλ(aH(·)) admits a selection s∗ ∈ M(H) with s∗(ω) ∈ Nλ(aH(ω)) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω . By (2) we have
s∗ ∈ N(a,H) and the strategy proﬁle s∗ also satisﬁes
λE
[
u1
(
s∗,aH
)]+ (1− λ)E[u2(s∗,aH)]= E[vλ(aH)].
Now, let us assume H ⊆ G . For the conditional expectation of a it holds that aH(ω) = EH[aG ](ω) for almost all ω, see
e.g. [2, Theorem 10.2]. As a consequence we have
E
[
vλ
(
aH(ω)
)]= E[vλ(EH[aG](ω))]. (5)
By assuming the convexity of vλ , we can apply Jensen’s inequality to obtain vλ(EH[aG ](ω))  EH[vλ(aG(ω))]. Using this
inequality together with the observation that E[EH[vλ(aG(ω))]] = E[vλ(aG(ω))] we get from (5) the inequality
E
[
vλ
(
aH(ω)
)]
 E
[
vλ
(
aG(ω)
)]
,
which is by (4) equivalent to having V λ(a,H) V λ(a,G). 
In the above theorem we could instead of convexity of vλ assume concavity and obtain negative value of information. If
vλ is aﬃne, i.e. both convex and concave, then the value of information is zero with respect to the selection. Note also that
strict convexity implies strictly positive value of information.
Now we shall show the converse result that λ-positive value of information implies convexity of vλ . In the proof we shall
need the following lemma, which states that convexity follows when there is a sequence of non-negative weights summing
to one and for which Jensen’s inequality holds. Compactness of A in the lemma is required in order to have
∑
j λ j x j ∈ A
when there are inﬁnitely many positive scalars in the sequence λ1, λ2, . . . . The fact that Jensen’s inequality implies convexity
and continuity for any two non-zero scalars is known as Bernstein–Doetsch theorem, see e.g. [9, Chapter VI]. We present
the proof of lemma for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 2. Let f be a bounded function on a convex and compact set A and let α1,α2, . . . be a sequence of non-negative scalars of
which at least two are positive and
∑
j α j = 1. Then f (
∑
j α j x j) 
∑
α j f (x j) for all x j ∈ A, j = 1,2, . . . implies that f is convex
on A.
Proof. Since f is bounded, there is M > 0 such that | f (x)| M on A. By this property f is 2M-convex on A, which means
that f (tx1 + (1− t)x2) t f (x1) + (1− t) f (x2) + 2M for all t ∈ [0,1], and x1, x2 ∈ A. Our aim is to show that the convexity
of f follows from this property and Jensen’s inequality for the given sequence.
Let us take any t ∈ [0,1] and x1, x2 ∈ A. We denote α−l = ∑ j =l α j . Let us now pick an index l such that α−l ∈ (0,1)
and α−l  min{t,1 − t}. This is possible since there are at least two strictly positive scalars among α1,α2, . . . . Note that
αl = 1− α−l . Without loss of generality we may assume that t  1− t which implies α−l  t . Then we have
tx1 + (1− t)x2 = α−l
[
tx1/α−l + (α−l − t)x2/α−l
]+ (1− α−l)x2,
and by the assumption on f and its 2M-convexity we get
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(
tx1 + (1− t)x2
)

∑
j =l
α j f
(
t
α−l
x1 + α−l − t
α−l
x2
)
+ (1− α−l) f (x2)
 α−l
[
t
α−l
f (x2) + α−l − t
α−l
f (x2) + 2M
]
+ (1− α−l) f (x2)
= t f (x1) + (1− t) f (x2) + 2α−lM.
Repeating the above deduction n-times we get that f is 2(α−l)nM-convex. Because α−l ∈ (0,1), we obtain convexity by
letting n become inﬁnitely large. 
In the following theorem we assume that there is a probability measure over Ω which has countable support and gives
positive probability for at least two states of the world.
Theorem 2. Let us assume (A1)–(A3), F = 2Ω , and that A is compact. Moreover, let the value of information be λ-positive, λ ∈ [0,1],
in Γ (u|a, {Ω,∅}) for all a ∈ A and some probability measureμwith countable support. Then vλ is convex and the value of information
is λ-positive in any game Γ (u|a,H) ∈ Γ (u) for any probability measure μ.
Proof. Let us denote H = {Ω,∅}. It can be seen from the proof of Theorem 1, that positive value of information in the game
Γ (u|a,H) implies that we have
E
[
vλ
(
EH[aF ](ω)
)]
 E
[
EH
[
vλ
(
aF (ω)
)]]
. (6)
Let us denote μi = Prob{ω = ωi}, where ωi belongs to the support of μ. We can index this support with 1,2, . . . . Then
we have EH[aF ](ω j) =∑ j μ ja(ω j). It follows that
E
[
vλ
(
EH[aF ](ω)
)]= vλ
(∑
j
μ ja(ω j)
)
.
We can also see that E[EH[vλ(aF (ω))]] =∑ j μ j vλ(a(ω j)). From (6) we obtain
vλ
(∑
j
μ ja(ω j)
)

∑
j
μ j v
λ
(
a(ω j)
)
,
which means by Lemma 2 that vλ is convex since a(ω j), j = 1,2, . . . , can be chosen from the convex set A. Note that
assumptions (A2) and (A3) guarantee that vλ is bounded. As Theorem 1 shows, the convexity of vλ then implies positive
value of information w.r.t. λ-selection in Γ (u|a,H) for any σ -subﬁeld H of F and any probability measure μ. 
3.2. Examples
In this section we demonstrate how the convexity of vλ can be utilized in analyzing zero-sum games and common
interest games. In zero-sum games the value of information changes as λ varies. This happens because the other player
gains from more information while the other player looses.
Remark 2. Let us assume that u2(x, a¯) = −u1(x, a¯) for all x ∈ X and a¯ ∈ A. If v1 is strictly convex, then there is λ′ ∈ (0,1)
such that the value of information is λ-positive for λ λ′ and λ-negative otherwise.
Formally, the result follows immediately by observing that
vλ(a¯) = (2λ − 1) max
x∈N(a¯)
u1(x, a¯) = (2λ − 1)v1(a¯).
Note that in zero-sum games it may also happen that vλ is neither convex nor concave.
Let us now consider common interest games. In these games there is a unique Pareto dominant point in utility space.
Consequently, the strategies that give the Pareto dominant point as an outcome constitute dominant Nash equilibria in these
games. Common interest games deserve special attention because they are closest to one-player decision problems as the
players would prefer to choose the same combination of actions. The following remark shows that common interest games
have λ-positive value of information for any λ. In the following section we shall further discuss common interest games.
Remark 3. Assume that the games of γ (u) have the common interest property. Then vλ is convex for any λ ∈ [0,1].
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vλ equals the weighted sum of optimal value functions for the players, i.e. vλ = λv1 + (1 − λ)v0. The result follows by
verifying that both v0 and v1 are convex. Without loss of generality we may consider v0. We need to show the inequality
v0(a¯α)  αv0(a¯1) + (1 − α)v0(a¯2), where a¯α = αa¯1 + (1 − α)a¯2 for all α ∈ [0,1] and for any a¯1, a¯2 ∈ A. First, from the
aﬃnity of u1 in a¯ we have v0(a¯α) = αu1(x(a¯α), a¯1) + (1− α)u1(x(a¯α), a¯2). Second, by the optimality of x(a¯k), k ∈ {1,2}, we
have v0(a¯k) u1(x(a¯α), a¯k) for k ∈ {1,2}. These two properties imply the convexity of v0. 
4. Positive value of information property
In this section we discuss the relation of λ-positive value of information and the positive value of information property
(PVIP), which means that any equilibrium in a game with less information is (weakly) Pareto dominated by an equilibrium
in a game with more information. First, we discuss the relationship of λ-selections and the PVIP for individual games and
then we consider the PVIP for a family of Bayesian games.
We deﬁne the positive value of information property for a game as follows. See [1] for the original deﬁnition.2
Deﬁnition 4. Γ (u|a,H) has the positive value of information property (PVIP) if for any G such that H ⊆ G and for any
equilibrium s ∈ N(a,H) there is s′ ∈ N(a,G) such that E[ui(s,a)] E[ui(s′,a)] for i ∈ I .
As we shall observe, λ-positive value of information for all λ provides a necessary condition for the PVIP, and in certain
cases this condition is also suﬃcient. Let us brieﬂy sketch why λ-selections play nicely together with the PVIP. First, observe
that for the PVIP it is enough to take dominant equilibria of the game with less information and ﬁnd equilibria in a game
with more information that dominate such equilibria. Next, note that λ-selections select among the dominant equilibria.
Thus, λ-positivity for all λ provides a necessary condition for the PVIP. When λ-selections pick all the dominant equilibria
as λ varies, then λ-positive value of information for all λ is also a suﬃcient condition for the PVIP. The two conditions that
we need are stated below.
(i) Γ (u|a,H) has positive value of information for all λ ∈ [0,1].
(ii) For any Pareto dominant equilibrium s ∈ N(a,H) there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that s is the maximizer that gives V λ(a,H).
As argued above, condition (i) provides a necessary condition for the PVIP and together the two conditions provide a
suﬃcient condition. Next, we relate the convexity of vλ for all λ to the positive value of information property of all games
in Γ (u). Recall that Γ (u) is the family of Bayesian games that can be derived from γ (u).
Deﬁnition 5. When all the games of Γ (u) have the PVIP, then Γ (u) is said to have the PVIP.
It follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the necessity of condition (ii) that the convexity of vλ for all λ is a necessary
condition for the PVIP of Γ (u).
Remark 4. Let us assume that (A1)–(A3) hold for u.
1. Convexity of vλ for all λ is a necessary condition for Γ (u) to have the PVIP.
2. Non-convexity of vλ for some λ is a suﬃcient condition for Γ (u) to not to have the PVIP.
Finally, let us discuss the suﬃciency of the convexity of vλ for the PVIP of Γ (u). As already observed, we need con-
dition (ii) for the games of Γ (u) to obtain the suﬃciency. This condition holds, e.g., when the equilibrium is unique up
to measure zero. More interestingly, it holds for common interest games, because for them λ-selections choose among the
dominant equilibria.
Remark 5. When the games of γ (u) have the common interest property for any a¯ then the games of Γ (u) satisfy condi-
tion (ii). Consequently, the convexity of vλ for all λ is a suﬃcient condition for Γ (u) to have the PVIP.
Remarks 5 and 3 together imply that common interest games have the PVIP, the result which is already known by
[1, Theorem 6].
2 There is a minor difference between Deﬁnition 4 and the original deﬁnition by [1]. Namely, they require that the inequality in E[ui(s,a)] E[ui(s′,a)]
is strict at least for one of the players.
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More information may have different consequences with respect to different equilibrium selections. We have considered
the value of public information when the equilibrium is selected so that it maximizes the weighted sum of players’ utilities.
We have shown that the value of public information is positive with respect to a selection, i.e., λ-positive, if the function
of maximal weighted sum of deterministic equilibrium payoffs is convex as a function of unknown parameters. This result
holds for all the Bayesian games that can be derived from given utility functions by varying the information ﬁeld and the
possible values of uncertain parameters. The main assumptions are that utility functions are aﬃne in uncertain parameters
and players have the same information.
Einy et al. [5] have previously established the relationship between deterministic equilibrium payoffs and the value of
information in symmetric duopoly games with unique equilibria. In addition to extending this approach to more general
games with multiple equilibria, we have also shown a converse result. When the utility functions are given and the infor-
mation has λ-positive value in the Bayesian games with minimal information and countably many states of the world, then
the maximal weighted sum of payoffs in deterministic games is convex. Consequently, the value of information is λ-positive
for any information ﬁeld if it is positive for Bayesian games with minimal information.
We have also discussed the relation of λ-positive value of information and the positive value of information property
(PVIP), which means that for any equilibrium in a game with less information there is an equilibrium in a game with
more information that dominates the ﬁrst one. Having λ-positive value of information for all λ is a necessary condition for
the PVIP. It is also a suﬃcient condition when the equilibrium is unique or the underlying deterministic games have the
common interest property.
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